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BOOK REVIEW

DEVELOPMENT EXACTIONS. Edited by James E. Frank* and
Robert M. Rhodes.** Washington, D.C.:
Planners Press, American Planning Association.
1987. Pp. 198. $29.95.

REVIEWED BY RICHARD

F.

BABCOCK'

M

OST people in this country are aware that many American cities
and towns are in a serious financial condition. The flow of federal dollars has been substantially cut, and few state and local dollars
can be raised to help with the increasing demands for services. So the
municipalities have looked to another source of funds to finance their
needs. And they have turned to the development community. If a
builder wants a subdivision approved or a permit for a shopping center, the city demands a site for a school, financial assistance in its
housing program, the widening of a highway, or a bundle of cash.
These demands are commonly known as "exactions."
I suspect the editors of the Law Review put me up to this Book
Review because they knew I was the special editor of a "competing"
publication on exactions, 2 and they hoped they could encourage a
good old-fashioned response and rejoinder among the respective publications. If that was their goal, they have failed. This is an excellent
publication with very few warts.
The national survey of exaction practices is especially useful. It is
comprehensive and detailed, appropriately weighted for size of city or
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county. Out of 11,722 cities and counties, 1,166 were sampled, with a
response rate of almost 39%.3 To me, the surprising responses were
those who answered that they made their demand on a case-by-case
basis-in other words, ad hoc. For example, in exactions involving
land dedication, 35.6% of the communities said they used such a technique, 4 and 30.1% replied they used standards but "with some flexibility." 5 However, we don't learn just what was meant by
"flexibility." In the case of cash payments, 17.4% of the communities
used a "case-by-case" basis, 6 and 7.9% had a formula, again, "with
some flexibility." ' 7 Because the survey is not intended to be judgmental, it does not express an opinion on the fact that one quarter of the
cash exactions involve discretion-how unbridled we are not told. It
would have been useful to follow up on those discretionary practices
to find out just how the communities did make their decision on what
applicants A and B should pay. Was there a denial of equal treatment?
In the chapter entitled "Politics and Administration of Development Exactions," ' 8 the authors touch on what may be the next major
issue in the administration of land use controls: joint ventures between cities or counties and private developers. First, the authors note
that "[e]xaction bargaining is a sufficiently powerful development
tool that, once used, is likely to quickly become a major part of the
land use controls of a community." 9 Then the authors go on to state:
Second, officials tend to smooth the sharp edges of exactions and
move toward accommodation and the tradeoffs with the developers.
Developers are no less adaptive. Especially in cities that wish to
grow rapidly-Scottsdale, Fairfield, Chandler, Colorado Springsdevelopers have learned from engaging in negotiations about
exactions that it is often necessary to become partners in what
amounts to joint ventures. 10

3. Bosselman & Stroud, Legal Aspects of Development Exactions, in DEVELOPMENT ExACTIONS 70-103 (1. Frank & R. Rhodes eds. 1987).
4. Id. at 126.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 141.
7. Id.
8. Weschler, Mushkatel & Frank, Politics and Administration of Development Exactions, in DEVELOPMENT EXACTIONS, supra note 3, at 15-41.
9. Id. at 38.
10. Id. at 38-39 (emphasis added).
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Just what those joint ventures involved, we are not told. Does the
city take a cut of the equity? We do know there are some communities
such as San Diego which have taken a share of the gross leases."
This raises the nice question of whether a city can be both a regulator and an entrepreneur. Is there an inherent conflict of interest? Suppose a city has a share of the equity in a shopping center and an
application comes to the city for a second shopping center within a
competitive area. What decision? Or suppose a city stands to pocket
an extra $57 million in the sale of its land if it grants a buyer a bonus
in floor area ratio, but that added height and bulk will have an alleged
adverse impact on a neighboring park. 2 Is that the selling of zoning as
one New York court has said?" And this raises the question whether
we should stop kidding ourselves and openly acknowledge that zoning
changes are for sale. If so, what does this mean insofar as comprehensive planning is concerned?
Bosselman and Stroud's chapter, "Legal Aspects of Development
Exactions,' ' 4 and their addendum after Nollan v. CaliforniaCoastal
Commission, 5 is a respectable (and predictable) analysis of the law in
this confused field. Of course, no aficionado of the land use field is
going to forego writing on Nollan, First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church v. County of Los Angeles, 6 and Keystone Bituminous.Coal
Association v. DeBenedictis.17 Critiques will overwhelm the law journals, ad nauseum.
The truth is that all of these cases raise as many questions as they
provide answers. Is Nollan simply an obvious extension of Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CA TV Corp.?'8 Or does it go beyond mere
physical invasion and suggest a new more rigid test for exactions? We
haven't yet had a definitive answer on the impact of First English on
moratoria, although it may be ventured that customary moratoria will
be upheld if set for a fixed period of time. Nor are we yet certain just
when a "taking" begins. Is it when the original zoning went into

11.
19 URB. LAND INST. PROJECT REFERENCE FILE, Oct.-Dec. 1986, at 5. See R. Babcock,
The City as Entrepreneur: Folly or Wisdom? 6.(Sept. 9, 1988)(draft of unpublished manuscript
prepared for the Urban Land Institute's Forum on Public/Private Partnership, Washington,
D.C., Sept. 30, 1988).
12. Municipal Art Soc'y v. City of New York, 137 Misc. 2d 832, 834-35, 522 N.Y.S.2d
800, 801 (Sup. Ct. 1987).
13. Id. at 838, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 804.
14. Bosselman & Stroud, supra note 3.
15. 107 S.Ct. 3141 (1987).
16. 107 S.Ct. 2378 (1987).
17. 107 S.Ct. 1232 (1987).
18. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
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effect or when, five years later, the landowner makes an application
for a change and is turned down? And on and on.
One area that Bosselman and Stroud do not touch on, probably
because they felt obliged to stick strictly to the decided cases, is the
large number of people who do not challenge exactions because of the
cost of litigation and the years of delay in obtaining a permit. I call
this municipal leverage. One of the interesting facts in the Nollan case
is that the Commission had "similarly conditioned 43 out of 60
coastal development permits along the same tract of land, and that of
the 17 not so conditioned, 14 had been approved when the Commission did not have administrative regulations in place allowing imposition of the condition, and the remaining 3 had not involved
shorefront property."' 9 So essentially, all shorefront properties had
granted an easement to the public to cross their property. I would
have to assume that most, if not all, of them were equally unhappy
about the condition. Unfortunately, unlike Mr. & Mrs. Nollan, they
did not have pro bono attorneys to carry their case through the Cali20
fornia Supreme Court and to the United States Supreme Court.
Municipalities may be poor but they are not fools. They know the
vagaries of the market most often will compel developers to get their
permits now and not take the risk and cost of litigation. For this reason, cities should not go into a death dance over these decisions.
On the whole, this is a superb publication useful to those who are
struggling with this new force in land use regulation.

19.

Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3144 (1987) (citation omit-

ted).
20. The Pacific Legal Foundation represented the Nollans throughout their suit with the
California Coastal Commission. Telephone interview with Timothy A. Bittle, Staff Att'y, Pacific Legal Foundation, Sacramento, California (Oct. 24, 1988).

